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Background: The health system of Iraqi Kurdistan is severely understudied, particularly with regard to patient-physician
interactions and their effects. We examine patterns of behaviour among physicians in Kurdistan, the justifications
given and possible enabling factors, with a view to understanding accountability both from above and below.
Methods: An ethnographic study was conducted in the Sulaimaniyah Teaching Hospital in the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq. Data was collected through negotiated interactive observation, and interviews were conducted with 10
participants, 5 physicians and 5 patients. Data collected was analysed using thematic analysis.
Results: Common patterns of practice among physicians in Kurdistan include displays of discontent, reluctance
to negotiate decisions with patients and unfavourable behaviours including dual practice and predatory behaviours
towards patients. These behaviours are justified as a mechanism of dealing with negative aspects of their work, including
overcrowding, low salaries and social pressure to live up to socially conceived ideas of a physician’s identity.
Conclusions: Michael Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucrats and their coping behaviours is a useful way to analyse the
Kurdish health system. Physician behaviours are enabled by a number of factors that work to enhance physician discretion
through lowering of upward and downward accountability. Physicians are under very little pressure to change their
behaviour, and as a result, they effectively become the street-level governing body of the Kurdish health system.
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Health systems in the Kurdistan Region are largely unstud-
ied. What little literature there is on the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq (KRI) health service is highly critical of it [1–3].
Tawfik-Shukor et al. [3] describe the Kurdish health system
as “centralised, politicised, nontransparent, disorganised
with no clear governance, regulatory financing or account-
ability framework let alone vision or goals”. There are also
accusations of corruption, predatory behaviour and mis-
management [1, 3, 4]. It is important to understand the* Correspondence: c.willott@ucl.ac.uk
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health system in order to determine how patients ex-
perience it. Only if we understand patient experiences
can we understand the quality of services provided by
the system [5].
This article examines the health system of the KRI
using Michael Lipsky’s [5] theory of street-level bureau-
cracy. We argue that examining health policy in the KRI
is an inadequate method of understanding the way that
citizens actually receive healthcare. In order to do so,
one must understand the activities, behaviours and rou-
tines of doctors, nurses and other staff working in the
KRI health system, conceptualized here as street-level
bureaucrats. In this article, we focus on doctors andAccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
ly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
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their work directly influence the experiences of patients
and that the current operation of the Kurdish health sys-
tem leads to significant discontent on the part of both
service providers and users.
Theoretical framework
This article draws heavily on the theory of street-level
bureaucracy elucidated by Michael Lipsky [5]. In his
seminal contribution, Lipsky describes employees of the
state with the discretion to dispense public rewards and
sanctions, including teachers, law enforcers and health
workers, as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). According to
Lipsky, SLBs have huge uncertainties within their work
environment, the “defining facet for which is that they
must deal with clients’ personal reactions to their deci-
sions” [5]. Lipsky states that the behaviours of SLBs
should be considered after understanding the contextual
conditions under which they work. Negative pressures as
well as constant exposure to dilemmas, for instance, the
ever-present gap between demand for services and
limited resources, as well as high workload and low gov-
ernment salaries [5–8], are said to compel SLBs into be-
haviours and practices that enable them to cope with
such unfavourable conditions. Macq et al. [8] state that
the low government salaries, combined with the high ex-
pectations SLBs have of their work, mean it is inevitable
that SLBs will “seize opportunities that are rewarding
professionally and financially” [8].
A factor that enables the development of coping strat-
egies is the considerable discretion afforded to SLBs,
which exists primarily because without it, the state
would become slow and unresponsive. For example, a
health professional’s discretion in decision-making is es-
sential to the effective management of highly variable
clients and situations, which may often be emergency
cases [6]. Blundo [9] explains that within Senegal a weak
sense of accountability to the public is another enabling
factor that allows the “daily negotiation” of resource allo-
cation, access to services and the application of policy to
suit the provider rather than the user of services. Lipsky
[5] argues that, “the decisions of SLBs, the routines they
establish, [and] the devices they invent to cope with un-
certainties and work pressure effectively become the
public policies they carry out.”
Understanding the behaviours and practices of SLBs as
well as the reasons behind them enables an understand-
ing of policy and its application. This has been described
as “real governance” by Olivier de Sardan [10]. Although
the concept of street-level bureaucracy is widely ac-
cepted, it has not been extensively studied within the
health sector. In fact, there is limited empirical evidence
that health professionals resort to coping strategies [11].
Therefore, the exploration of the theory of street-levelbureaucracy in the health sector, as well as medical staff
and their coping mechanisms, is a significant gap within
the literature.
A further important reason for the discussion of SLBs
in health lies in the asymmetry of information that exists
in healthcare. This means that health workers, and phy-
sicians in particular, have a great deal of power over
their patients precisely because of this information gap.
How they use this power has a critical impact on the
way that resources are distributed in the healthcare
sector.
Setting
Kurdistan is a vast region in the Middle East, including
part of four different countries: Iraq, Iran, Syria and
Turkey. The KRI is currently the only region with a
semi-autonomous government and has been formally
recognized as Kurdistan. There have been moves towards
independence for Iraqi Kurdistan in recent months.
This region has undergone consecutive wars, internal
conflicts and international and domestic sanctions over
the last four decades. This resulted in the demise of the
health system from one of the best in the Middle East in
the 1980s to an out-dated, heavily overcrowded and ineffi-
cient system today [3–12]. The isolation of the area during
the 1990 sanctions and Gulf War meant that Iraq’s health
professionals were cut off from the world, resulting in a
generation of physicians who graduated with inadequate
training and poor motivation [1, 13]. Along with being
poorly motivated, physicians in Kurdistan have also been
described as patient-unfriendly, corrupt and inefficient
[1–3, 7]. There is low expenditure on health services in
Iraq – 4.1 % of GDP in 2008 [1] – which combined with
an overcrowded health system gives rise to undesirable
working conditions among health professional in KRI
hospitals.
Methods
An ethnographic methodology was used to conduct this
study. Data was collected by Goshan Karadaghi (GK)
from April to June 2013 within the Sulaimaniyah Teach-
ing Hospital, situated in Sulaimaniyah, the second largest
city of the KRI region. Data was collected within the
consultancy ward and the surgical emergency ward of
the teaching hospital. These two wards are very different.
The consultancy ward consists of a number of examin-
ation rooms wherein specialized doctors are seated and
patients queue to see them. However, the surgical emer-
gency ward is mainly covered by junior or less experienced
doctors, who are supervised by specialized physicians. In
the surgical emergency ward, physicians are expected to
go to patients. These two settings gave the opportunity to
observe physician behaviour within structurally different
work conditions.
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terms “negotiated interactive observation”, where she
sought to retain her role as researcher rather than seek-
ing to take on the role of physician, patient or visitor.
This method is said to “capture what happens when
doing fieldwork without at the same time assuming that
you become one of [the participants]” [14]. This enabled
GK to gain greater access to information from both pa-
tients and physicians without compromising ethical
guidelines.
During observations, informal data was collected in-
cluding observations of physician behaviour, patient be-
haviour, details of physician-patient interactions and
informal conversations with participants regarding the
subject of study. All participants were Kurdish, as GK’s
inability to speak or understand Arabic, the other lan-
guage spoken in KRI, was a barrier in approaching such
individuals. Ten participants were interviewed, five phy-
sicians and five patients. Physicians who were inter-
viewed had been approached during observations, while
patients were approached outside of hospital settings.
The interviews were done in public places, where the
participants felt comfortable, enabling participants to
speak freely, away from the gaze of people involved in
health services, as well as upholding the anonymity of
the participant. Interviews were voice recorded and
digitally transcribed.
Sampling was done through a combination of conveni-
ence and snowball sampling. Initial contacts with physi-
cians were made through a gatekeeper, and further
contacts were made through these physicians. Patients
were recruited using a convenience sampling technique.
A thematic analysis framework was used to analyse the
data. This is an inductive process of analysis, wherein
hypotheses and themes emerged from the data itself.
Long table analysis methods were used during the con-
tinuous cycles of familiarizing, coding and thematic
categorization with every new addition to the data set.
As a result, a number of themes and subthemes emerged
from the data.
GK is a Kurdish female who has been brought up in
the United Kingdom, with a mix of both Kurdish and
British cultural values. This means that her outlook and
the way she understands cultural cues are through ex-
posure to both British and Kurdish culture. This aspect
of her identity meant that her awareness of Kurdish cul-
ture and social protocol was perhaps more than that of a
non-Kurd in the field. This was as much a hindrance as
it was a help, as of course knowing a culture enables
greater integration particularly if you are considered
“one of them”. However, as she is considered a member
of the Kurdish community and answers to those social
rules, this meant that she was not as free as other re-
searchers would be. For example, as an unmarriedwoman, she could not approach male participants with-
out being introduced to them first, as to do so would
have been against social protocol and would have had an
effect upon her reputation within the community. Com-
munication with male participants in particular had to
remain to a certain extent formal for the same reason.
We do not believe that GK’s presence had much of an
effect on the data gathered. In the initial period of data
collection, physicians may have felt under scrutiny and
behaved differently from normal, but as time passed,
they became much more at ease. It is also the case that
patients in KRI hospitals are often seen two or three at a
time, so both doctors and patients are used to “others”
being present during consultations.
There are some limitations to the methodology adopted,
most particularly that research only took place in one hos-
pital, so generalizing beyond this one case is difficult. This
is often a problem with ethnography. Nonetheless, we
argue that our findings chime with other research in this
area and can therefore be seen as an important addition to
the existing literature on the topic of the everyday oper-
ation of health systems in the Middle East.
Ethics
Ethical approval for conducting this research was granted
by the UCL ethics committee and by the Sulaimaniyah
directorate of health and the Ministry of Health of the
Kurdistan Regional government. All observed and inter-
viewed participants were informed of the nature of the
study, the exact nature of their participation and the
possible uses of the study through an information sheet.
After it was established that participants understood the
aims and intentions of the study, they were asked to sign
consent forms. Special ethical consideration was given to
truthfulness, confidentiality and security of participants
[15]. All patients were approached outside of the hospital
and the gaze of physicians, to avoid the possibility of
physicians identifying participating patients in case they
change the way they act towards them.
Results and discussion
Discontent
Throughout observations of patient-physician interactions
within the Sulaimaniyah Teaching Hospital, a recurring
pattern of behaviour that physicians demonstrated was
that of displays of discontent. Physicians openly express
emotions like anger, frustration and impatience regularly
when interacting with patients, through both physical
manners – the use of dismissive body language and facial
expressions – and verbal manners – raising one’s voice,
speaking down to patients and the use of implicit language
suggesting contempt. Displays of discontent are not only
expressed by physicians, however. Medical assistants and
porters also display impatience and frustration. It is a
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tem and forms quite a hostile environment for patients.
Physicians in Kurdistan justify these patterns of behav-
iour most commonly as a means of dealing with an
over-utilized system. The Kurdish health system is in-
tensely overcrowded [1, 2, 4]. The hospital-based health-
seeking culture, lack of appointment system and the fact
that the public system is free, or has a very minimal
charge for services, mean that a large number of patients
utilize the services available. Physicians identify the con-
flict between limited resources and high demand that
arises as a result of these conditions [5, 6, 8]. However,
in this context, the resource that is demanded most is
the time and attention of physicians. One physician ex-
plained that doctors may see up to 200 patients within a
6-h shift.
These unfavourable working conditions may be a justifi-
cation for the adoption of coping behaviours, as described
by Lipsky [5]. The overloaded system, along with patient
expectations of being seen quickly, encourages physicians
to adopt behaviours that enable the quick processing of
patients and the prevention of burnout [16].
The expression of anger and impatience, especially if it
is not retaliated against, can also be viewed as a method
of establishing one’s authority [16]. Within the strongly
hierarchical Kurdish society, physicians hold a senior so-
cial position and are described as an elite social group
both by physicians and patients. Physicians are granted a
position of prestige, primarily because of the perceived
“sacred” and positive nature of their work and the fact
that they historically have been the wealthiest and most
educated members of society [12]. This grants them a
respect that all members of society, particularly patients,
are obliged to show. Signs of submission, through lower-
ing one’s head or placing one’s hand on one’s chest, are
acknowledgements of status of people of social import-
ance. These behaviours are brought into the consultation
room and therefore shape the manner with which pa-
tients and physicians interact. To remind patients of
their authority, through the display of discontent, physi-
cians are in effect reminding patients of their relative in-
feriority and the value of the physician’s time as a
resource. As one patient explained:
You have to respect doctors, you have to basaqa and
baqurban (plead with) them…because they might get
angry and make your treatment more difficult.
This may play a part in explaining the common submis-
sive nature of patients that GK observed during her field-
work and more significantly explains the lack of resistance
that patients showed towards physicians and their deci-
sions. Nielsen [7] found that SLBs respond more positively
to patients who are obliging and respectful, becausetreating such individuals is less complicated than treating
hostile patients. Some physicians did express their prefer-
ence for compliant patients, particularly as this means
that physicians have a greater discretionary freedom in
decision-making. We argue that considering the demand
on the physician’s time, these displays of discontent act to
deter patient resistance and input into the decision-
making process in order to limit the time required for
each consultation, as well as to smoothen the physician’s
journey through the working day. This form of behaviour
is enabled because of social principles of respect and sta-
tus. The social protocol of respecting hierarchically super-
ior individuals such as physicians is to acknowledge their
authority and therefore to increase their discretionary
freedom [17]. This discretionary freedom is a significant
feature of SLB theory [5], as it is an enabler of coping be-
haviour adoption.
Lack of health awareness
The lack of health awareness among patients is a factor
that is widely identified by physicians as a problem that
adds to their workload, compelling physicians to adopt
coping strategies, and therefore is used to justify displays
of discontent. It is also used as a justification for another
common practice: the reluctance to explain conditions,
their causes or their management to patients. This reluc-
tance is justified as a means of dealing with limited time.
Within the 2- to 3-min time slot designated for each
consultation [3], it is impossible to expect in-depth ex-
planation or negotiation of decisions, a fact which is ex-
acerbated by the low level of health knowledge among
patients in Kurdistan. Physicians explain that even if
time constraints were not an issue, still the “reassurance
of patients is futile, patients don’t understand, they are
incompetent”:
I don’t know, I try to explain, but sometimes if you do
its not understood by the patient, I don’t really have
30 minutes to spare for every patient to explain a
procedure especially if they still don’t understand… so
most doctors don’t, most prefer to just say ‘you need
an operation, come in on Tuesday’.
We would argue, however, that there may be another
motive behind the lack of explanation of decisions re-
garding a patient’s health and that is that maintaining an
asymmetry of knowledge allows the physician to main-
tain power over the patient [18, 19]. This acts to en-
hance one’s discretion, therefore limiting resistance to
one’s authority and increasing the respect and compli-
ance of the patient. Nielsen [7] argues that the greater
the level of knowledge of patients, the greater their negoti-
ating ability. Although the logistics of communicating
health knowledge is the justification used by physicians to
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see how the lack of sharing of knowledge acts to exacer-
bate unequal physician-patient power relations. Patient-
physician interactions demonstrate the distance between
physician and patient not only in knowledge but also in
status [17]. Physicians described themselves as an elite so-
cial group that rarely mixes with general society. This so-
cial separation is often attributed to the high position of
physicians in the social hierarchy and the respect that is
attributed to such a position [20, 21]. Patients noted their
resentment of this separation to GK during the research.
However, any demonstration of discontent from pa-
tients towards physicians within interactions was not ob-
served. This is likely to be due to respect and status.
Physicians appear to assert their status through behav-
iours that separate them from others, for instance, how
they dress, or speak, or indeed where they choose to sit
in the wards – often behind a large desk, quite distant
from the patient. We acknowledge that behaviours that
encourage physical separation may be assimilated, as the
culture within which physicians are formed instil these be-
haviours as normal. However, such behaviours, whether
intentional or assimilated, remind patients to give physi-
cians the respect society grants them. One physician de-
scribed how social expectations shape such perceptions:
I remember in medical school, one of our teachers
comes in and says, you are above the rest you should
act like you’re above the rest, you are the leaders of
the leaders, you are the top of the top so act like this,
behave yourselves.
This social separation encourages the perception of
patients and physicians being on opposing sides. A doc-
tor claimed that patients “consider us [physicians] as
enemies”.
Unfavourable behaviours
The social separation and status of physicians is a key
determinant of power relations. However, with regard to
unfavourable behaviours, it is the social expectations of
physicians that are of great significance. By unfavourable
behaviour we refer to acts of physicians that would nor-
mally be deemed to have a negative impact on the ser-
vices that are provided for a patient or the health service
in general. One example of this is participation in dual
practice. This is a common feature of the Kurdish health
system, wherein the majority of physicians work in both
public and private sectors. Macq et al. [8] describe that
physicians in dual practice often just compete with
themselves and therefore conflicts of interest arise as a
result of this [2, 22]. This point is used to explain the
observed – sometimes intentional – demise of public
sector quality of care. These observations have beenacknowledged by physicians in Kurdistan also, wherein
two physicians argued that motivation for work within
the public sector is considerably less than in private
practices. Physicians justify working in the private sector
as it allows the standard of living that is closer to what
physicians expect. A doctor explained that public sector
salaries are not enough to live the lifestyle that both phy-
sicians and society expect physicians to live:
Doctors get $1200 [per month] for their work when
they start. You become settled as a doctor at 34+
years. Iraqi law dictates that you retire at 63 - within
this time you need to achieve what society expects
doctors to be…. doctors are surrounded by other
doctors with a nice car, a few flats and a plot of land
for weekends. You cannot achieve this on a government
salary.
Ferrinho and Leberghe [11] claim that a way to explain
these practices is to understand that health professionals
are often socialized within a context where they them-
selves and society come to expect a standard of living
that cannot be met by government salaries. This descrip-
tion is quite fitting with regard to the KRI. Physicians
regularly referred to the pressure they felt from social
expectations of them. Hegemonic groups of society, in
this case physicians in Kurdistan, are characterized by
their disproportionate possession of what Sidanius and
Pratto [23] call “positive social value” referring to mater-
ial and symbolic things that people aspire to having.
Physicians are, within Kurdish society, a social group
that children are encouraged to aspire to. A patient ex-
plained that this is because of the monetary security that
is assumed to arise from being in the medical profession.
A doctor described the disparity between what society
expects physicians to have and what they can afford on
government wages, and another referred to the judge-
ment that physicians face based on their material expres-
sion of wealth and therefore status:
A simple thing like taking the bus, they say ‘look at
that doctor, he is so cheap’. They lose respect for you
because they laugh at you, so you can’t accept that,
and you buy a car, but even that must be a flashy new
one, otherwise ‘what sort of doctor are you?’
Hence, to have the “nice car, a few flats, and a plot of
land for weekends” is, in the mind of many physicians, a
factor that enables them to uphold social expectations
and, more importantly, the respect of society. Therefore,
it is justified for a physician to pursue extra income out-
side the public sector. These motives of moonlighting
for income have been exacerbated by the recent post-
war economic boost that the KRI has enjoyed [24]. This
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archy and patterns of education, wealth and status have
changed. There is resentment from physicians towards
individuals who are less educated and conventionally are
of a lower social status but who have the financial ability
to compete with physicians:
A doctor looks and sees an uneducated man who
doesn’t even know how to sign a document is a
contractor and is a millionaire. But all the doctors put
together won’t have as much as one contractor. This
causes animosity among people.
Therefore, physicians feel the need to compete with
such individuals in order to uphold their positions of
status within Kurdish society. This demonstrates the im-
portance of material indicators of wealth and the attrib-
uted status that is granted with such expressions of wealth
within Kurdish society [24]. Along with dual practice,
however, physicians have been accused of predatory be-
haviours within public health services for private service
gain. Although such behaviours were not witnessed during
observations (perhaps as a consequence of GK’s presence),
physicians and patients commonly mentioned such behav-
iours among physicians. These accusations include pres-
suring patients from public services into private clinics
and the use of public hospital resources for private pa-
tients. One doctor stated:
Yes the doctor uses the public sector for his private
gain. He admits patients from his private clinic, uses
government resources for their operation and sees the
patient in the private clinic after.
These behaviours have also been documented in other
studies of the Kurdish health system. Tawfik-Shukor
et al. [3], for instance, describe physicians in Kurdistan
as having a “parasitic orientation towards the use of pub-
lic hospitals”. They argue that physicians in the public
sector have little incentive to promote public health ser-
vices, because of low pay and being overworked. There-
fore, they pursue job satisfaction by increasing their
income through working in the private sector. We argue,
however, that in this instance Lipsky’s definition of SLBs
being compelled to adopting behaviours because of the
negative aspects of their work – in this case, social judge-
ment – may be too simplistic an explanation. Nielsen [7]
describes the possibility that SLBs may be equally enticed
into coping behaviours in order to reinforce or seek out
positive rewards. Physicians may be compelled into pursu-
ing extra monetary income to avoid social judgement, but
the sense of accomplishment they get from being able to
afford items of positive social value may also be a signifi-
cant driving force in the maintenance of such behaviours.Similarly, with the increase in wealth comes a reinforced
social status and social respect, much like the outcome of
displays of discontent and reluctance to negotiate infor-
mation. Physicians may feel they have to undertake such
coping behaviours to deal with a heavily overcrowded sys-
tem, and to avoid social judgement, but we argue they
may also want to behave in such ways because such be-
haviours are reinforced by the positive benefits they may
obtain.
Patients attribute the pursuit of such behaviours to
physicians being “money hungry”. Physicians deny this
and explain that the money they generate is to satisfy so-
cial expectations, as well as their personal expectations
of what a physician’s lifestyle is supposed to be. By doing
so, they uphold their social standing. The negative percep-
tion of the behaviours of physicians by patients, however,
does not influence their behaviour. SLBs are technically
accountable to their public [5, 25], though in this instance,
although there is apparent discontent among patients, it
has little influence on the behaviours of physicians.
Discretion and accountability
Behaviours such as displays of discontent, limited com-
munication of information and unfavourable behaviours
are justified as ways of managing negative pressures of
physicians’ working conditions. There are a number of en-
abling factors that allow these behaviours to be adopted
by limiting accountability and consequently increasing the
discretion of physicians, the first of these being a general
presence of fear and lack of trust towards the Kurdish
health system and its physicians.
Trust among patients towards physicians is low, evi-
dent in the common practice of patients seeing multiple
physicians for one condition, to check the accuracy of
diagnoses and treatments. Physicians acknowledged this
lack of trust and primarily attributed it to the role of the
media in exposing scare stories about the system and
the lack of education of patients for believing them. Pa-
tients mention these stories as a justification for their
mistrust of the competence of physicians in Kurdistan.
The intentions of physicians are also questioned by pa-
tients, a number of whom brought up the maternity ward
as an example to demonstrate this. There is a belief that
patients are denied caesarean sections within the mater-
nity wards because it gives physicians an opportunity to
force people into their private clinics for the procedure.
Physicians do not deny that they take advantage of the
situation. One doctor explained that a history of using
physicians as scapegoats for the inadequacies of the health
system both under the Ba’ath regime and the current re-
gional government have only fed these feelings of mistrust
and fear among patients.
Another possible factor, which adds to the mistrust and
fear of physicians, is the recurring practice of doctors
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have identified for patients. Similarly, they openly criticize
the competence of other physicians in front of patients.
This behaviour may be explained by the competition that
arises when physicians work within the private sector, as
to berate a fellow physician is to limit the competition for
your clinic, especially as patients choose to see private
physicians based on word of mouth and the reputation of
the doctor among the community. This common mistrust
is often used as a justification of the fear that patients feel
towards physicians, along with their anticipation of being
shouted at or dismissed. This fear acts as an enabler of
adopted behaviours, because it exacerbates the inequality
of the physician-patient power relationship. To fear a
physician is to grant them greater power over interactions
and, therefore, grant them greater discretion in decision-
making. This discretion can also be enhanced through the
limiting of accountability that physicians have both in in-
teractions with patients and with regard to top-down
regulation.
SLBs are characteristically held accountable through
both bottom-up and top-down regulation [26]. However,
within the Kurdish health system, physicians have very lit-
tle accountability to patients, primarily due to physician-
patient power relations. The hierarchical separation of
physicians and patients and the submissive identity that
patients are granted mean that they are denied their ability
to hold physicians accountable. This fact is exacerbated by
the fact that the paternalistic nature of interactions means
that physicians control resource access and allocation.
Skirbekk et al. [26] state that “[p]atients are, whether they
like it or not, whether they think of it or not – at risk re-
garding the competence and goodwill of the physicians”.
A patient expressed this unmistakeably when she de-
scribes that:
You can’t really tell a doctor, what you’re doing is
wrong, because even if you do, nothing will change,
except that the doctor will probably dismiss you, and
you don’t get treated.
There is a perception among patients that even if at-
tempts were made to address these behaviours, as a pa-
tient said, “nothing will change”. There is a belief that
physicians are untouchable because of the concept of
“psht” or backing.
Many of those doctors have ‘psht’, they have friends in
high places with political power, so even if you were to
complain nothing would happen, a few wastas [social
favours] here and there would make sure of that.
Therefore, what patient protective policy is present or
is established in the future may not be effective ifpatients and physicians themselves feel physicians are
above the law.
Physicians have very little if any top-down accountabil-
ity either. There is no monitoring of physician activity or
regulation of private-public health sector relations [1–3],
and physicians know this. One physician referred to the
prevalence of social relationships within Kurdish society.
Many physicians have powerful connections with policy
makers. These relationships, the fact that the KRI region
still suffers from a shortage of physicians and the sheer
number of physicians participating in these behaviours
mean that the regional government cannot do much to
regulate physicians using top-down approaches either.
This point is reiterated by Miller [27] who states when
describing corrupt behaviours in Eastern Europe that it
is “not so much the morally corrupt few, as the behav-
iourally corruptible many” who are the problem. Blundo
[9] explains the influence these conditions have on top-
down regulation when he argues that in certain circum-
stances where the state has no real solution to deal with
behaviours of SLBs, it voluntarily averts its gaze and by
default forms a permissive space that consequentially le-
gitimizes such irregular practices. In essence, because
patients aren’t given the assurance that physicians will
be reprimanded, they withhold their complaints and
comply with the whims of physicians, as they in effect
are the governing body of the Kurdish health system.
Therefore, the lack of top-down regulation deters the
presence of street-level regulation.
As a result of these factors, physicians within the Kurd-
ish health system have considerable discretion regarding
their practices and control of resources. This is a signifi-
cant factor that enables the adoption of coping behaviours,
because it not only limits the obstacles to them but also
by default legitimizes these behaviours. Physicians there-
fore are in a state of absolute discretion in behaviour and
consequentially in the making of street-level policies.
Therefore, policy change may be a futile means of ad-
dressing these issues if the system of accountability is not
addressed.
Conclusions
This article has opened a window into the Kurdish
health system and how the wider cultural context influ-
ences decisions, interactions and behaviours within hos-
pitals. Behaviours within interactions such as displays of
discontent and the reluctance of physicians to share
health information, as well as unfavourable behaviours
such as dual practice and predatory behaviours towards
patients and the health system, have been identified
within Kurdish hospitals as common patterns of prac-
tice. One may label these behaviours as forms of coping
behaviours as Lipsky would describe, as they are justified
as mechanisms of coping with or making the best of
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ditions are attributed to high workload, low salaries and
conflicts between demand and access to resources [5–8]
although positive influences appear to play a role in en-
ticing physicians into these behaviours also. However,
the most significant finding of this study was the identi-
fication of factors that enable these coping behaviours.
Power relations play a significant part in this and are
fuelled by society’s hierarchical values, the distance be-
tween physicians and patients – both because of social
status and information asymmetry – and the prevalence
of both fear and lack of trust towards physicians. These
power relations reinforce physician authority and patient
inferiority. This limits the power with which patients may
hold physicians accountable, and therefore, there is lim-
ited if any bottom-up regulation of physician behaviour.
The desperate need in the region for physicians, as
well as the widespread culture of these adopted behav-
iours and the lack of top-down regulatory bodies, leaves
a health system that is de facto governed by physicians.
This is an absolute condition of discretionary freedom,
where physicians are free to do as they please, and this
is the defining factor that explains the adoption of be-
haviours that are common practice among doctors in
Kurdistan.
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